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Book Note
BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT, by Tamara Piety1
HOW COEXTENSIVE ARE THE rights of a corporation with that of a natural person, 
and when did the metaphor of corporate personhood begin to be taken literally? 
Tamara Piety forcefully confronts these questions, using the United States 
Supreme Court case of Nike Inc v Kasky2 as a framing device. The argument that 
emerged in this case—that politically tinged commercial speech is entitled to full 
First Amendment protection—is the natural evolution of the Supreme Court’s 
controversial holding in Citizens United v Federal Elections Commission,3 in which 
corporations were held to stand on equal ground with citizens in their right to 
political speech. Countering what she sees as First Amendment jurisprudence 
run amok, Piety interrogates the principles underpinning freedom of expression 
and forcefully argues against their application to commercial speech. 
The book is divided into three parts. Part I lays out the parallel development 
of the commercial speech and corporate political speech doctrines while charting 
their collision course. Noting that the protection of commercial speech is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, Piety discusses the 1976 case of Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,4 in which the Court 
held that truthful commercial expression was entitled to limited protection on 
the basis of the listener’s right to potentially useful information. Nevertheless, in 
the absence of a satisfying definition of what commercial speech is, advocates 
1. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012) 328 pages.
2. 539 US 654 (2003).
3. 130 S Ct 876 (2010). 
4. 425 US  748 (1976). 
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of corporate political speech, which is entitled to full constitutional protection, 
have begun to blur the doctrinal lines. Piety criticizes the merging of political and 
commercial speech doctrines, noting their divergent theoretical underpinnings 
and the litany of economic regulations that will be subject to attack using this 
supercharged First Amendment entitlement. Part I concludes by returning to the 
first principles of freedom of expression and the constellation of interests that it was 
meant to advance: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) attainment of truth; (3) public 
participation in the political process; and (4) the maintenance of a balance between 
stability and change.5
Part II explores the first set of these interests: individual self-fulfillment 
and the attainment of truth. In Emerson’s formulation of the principle, 
individual self-fulfillment encompasses notions of autonomy, self-expression, 
and self-actualization—interests, Piety argues, that are not advanced by an 
untrammelled commercial speech environment in which representations cannot 
even be regulated for their truth. Because corporations are simply means to 
ends,6 they are not, by definition, autonomous and they cannot self-actualize; 
the rights of the listener, therefore, are the appropriate locus of the commercial 
speech doctrine. Piety argues that the net effect of manipulative branding efforts 
is to actively impede an individual’s struggle for autonomy and fulfillment—to 
say nothing of the truth-obfuscating effects of a marketing environment in which 
accuracy cannot be regulated—and we are more susceptible to it than we would 
like to believe.7 
In Part III, Piety engages with the democratic rationales for freedom 
of expression, arguing that neither principle advanced by Emerson—public 
participation and balancing between stability and change—is furthered by 
enhanced protection of commercial speech. Indeed, commercial influence already 
distorts the political process, as the corporate form allows for an accumulation 
of wealth that amplifies its voice. Moreover, by constraining the ability of 
democratically elected bodies to regulate corporate speech, or commerce more 
generally, a more protective commercial speech doctrine is anti-democratic and 
counter-majoritarian.
5. Piety borrows this framework from Thomas Emerson. See “Toward a General Theory of the 
First Amendment” (1963) 72 Yale LJ 877.
6. Piety adopts a Kantian view of autonomy, which flows from the idea that human beings are 
ends in themselves. See Piety, supra note 1 at 79.
7. Piety points to recent developments in behavioural economics focusing on the predictably 
irrational ways in which humans make decisions. See Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, 
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Human Happiness (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2008).
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Brandishing the First Amendment smartly returns to the first principles of 
freedom of expression, thereby bringing recent doctrinal developments into 
stark relief. The tone throughout is polemical, yet Piety avoids the tendency 
to characterize corporations as villainous or the evolution of marketing 
strategies as conspiratorial. Rather, the author looks past the abstractly logical, 
but commonsensically nonsensical premises of Citizens United to the realities 
of the modern marketplace of ideas. This is an environment in which the 
government gives consumers fewer and fewer tools for parsing sophisticated 
marketing strategies and where the consequences of fraudulent proliferations of 
misinformation are increasingly grave. 

